has asked' whether there is any sentence in the language of his calculus of individuals which says whether there are finitely or infinitely many atoms. More precisely: is there any sentence that is true (false) in every finite intended model, regardless of its size, but not in any infinite atomic intended model? We shall show that there is no such sentence. We cannot say that there are finitely (infinitely) many atoms unless 1) we say something more specific about the number of atoms, or 2) we enlarge the language by providing for infinite conjunctions or disjunctions, or 3) we enlarge the language by providing suitable new predicates.
The atomic calculus of individuals (henceforth ACI) is the theory axiomatized by D1-D5, El-E3, and AA. By examining Goodman's discussion of the calculus of individuals,2 it is easy to verify that the definitional and existential axioms hold in every intended model. The axiom of atomicity holds in just those intended models-atomic intended models-in which everything consists entirely of atoms. We are not concerned with the remaining intended models, in which things may consist wholly or partly of infinitely divisible nonatomic stuff. All finite intended models are atomic.
For any positive number n, we can write a certain sentence saying that there are at least n atoms. (Later we will say exactly which such sentence it is to be.) Call these sentences numerative sentences. We shall prove the following Normal Form Theorem:
Any sentence in the language of ACI is equivalent in ACI to a truth-functional compound of numerative sentences, and there is an effective procedure for finding one such equivalent of any given sentence.
Given this theorem, our negative answer to Goodman's question is an easy corollary. Call a sentence indiscriminate if and only if it has the same truth value in every infinite atomic intended model and also in every finite intended model with sufficiently many atoms. We seek a sentence that is not indiscriminate, being true in every finite intended model but false in every infinite atomic intended model (or vice versa). But every numerative sentence is indiscriminate, being true in every finite or infinite intended model with more than some number of atoms. And since every negation of an indiscriminate sentence is indiscriminate, and every conjunction of indiscriminate sentences is indiscriminate, every truth-func-tional compound of numerative sentences is indiscriminate. Every sentence equivalent in ACI to an indiscriminate sentence is indiscriminate. Therefore every sentence is indiscriminate, and the sentence we seek does not exist.
The Normal Form Theorem has several other interesting consequences. For any positive number n, let ACIJ be the theory obtained from ACI by adding as further axioms the numerative sentence saying that there are at least n atoms and the negation of the numerative sentence saying that there are at least n+1 atoms; and let ACILO be the theory obtained from ACI by adding as further axioms every numerative sentence. Call these theories numerative extensions of ACI. Assuming that intended models come in all finite, and some infinite, sizes-size being number of atoms-each numerative extension of ACI is the theory of a nonempty class of intended models: ACIJ is the theory of all intended atomic models of size n, ACL0 is the theory of all infinite atomic intended models. (We can restate our negative answer to Goodman's question thus: ACIQO is not finitely axiomatizable.) In each numerative extension of ACI, every numerative sentence can be effectively proved or disproved. Therefore the Normal Form Theorem provides a decision procedure for each numerative extension of ACI. It follows that the numerative extensions of ACI are maximal consistent, and it is easy to show that they are the only maximal consistent extensions of ACI. It also follows that ACI is a semantically complete theory of the class of all atomic intended models: given any set of sentences consistent with ACI, it can be embedded in a maximal consistent extension of ACI which, by our previous result, is one of the numerative extensions of ACI and therefore is true in the atomic intended models of the appropriate size. Finally, provided we disregard those models in which identity receives a nonstandard interpretation,3 it follows that any finite model of ACI, intended or not, is isomorphic to an intended model: it satisfies some ACIn along with the intended models of size n, and any two finite models of the same maximal consistent theory with (standardly interpreted) identity are isomorphic. We have obtained these results about atomic intended models without ever saying what those are; it was sufficient to know that they are models of ACI, they are standard with respect to identity, and they come in all finite, and some infinite, sizes.
It only remains to prove the Normal Form Theorem. We obtain it as a special case of a stronger normal form theorem, applicable not only to sentences but to all formulas in the language of ACI.
If 
